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Abstract
This paper analyzes risk capital allocation problems. For risk capital allocation problems, the aim is to allocate
the risk capital of a firm to its divisions. Risk capital allocation is of central importance in risk-based performance
measurement. We consider a case in which the aggregate risk capital is determined via a coherent risk measure.
The academic literature advocates an allocation rule that, in game-theoretic terms, is equivalent to using the
Aumann-Shapley value as solution concept. This value is however not well-defined in case a differentiability
condition is not satisfied. As an alternative, we introduce an allocation rule inspired by the Shapley value in a
fuzzy setting. We take a grid on a fuzzy participation set, define paths on this grid and construct an allocation
rule based on a path. Then, we define a rule as the limit of the average over these allocations, when the grid
size converges to zero. We introduce this rule for a broad class of coherent risk measures. We show that if
the Aumann-Shapley value is well-defined, the allocation rule coincides with it. If the Aumann-Shapley value
is not defined, which is due to non-differentiability problems, the allocation rule specifies an explicit allocation.
It corresponds with the Mertens value, which is originally characterized in an axiomatic way (Mertens, 1988),
whereas we provide an asymptotic argument.
JEL-Classification: C71, G32
1 Introduction
This paper proposes a rule to allocate risk capital among divisions within a firm. Regulators require that financial
institutions withhold a level of capital that is invested safely in order to mitigate the effects of adverse events such
as, for example, a financial crisis. This amount of capital is referred to as risk capital. Regulatory requirements
focus at the level of risk capital to be withheld at firm level. Our focus is on how this amount of risk capital is
allocated to different business divisions within the firm.1 This problem is called the risk capital allocation problem.
There are several reasons why firms want to allocate risk capital to divisions. First, allocating risk capital
is important for performance evaluation. Investment activities of financial institutions are typically divided into
different portfolios, with different divisions within the firm being responsible for different portfolios. It is not
uncommon that the managers of these divisions are evaluated on the basis of the return earned on the amount
of risk capital to be withheld for their portfolio. This requires an allocation of risk capital to divisions that is
perceived as “fair” by the managers. Second, allocating risk capital to business divisions is important for decisions
regarding whether to increase or decrease the engagement in the activities of certain divisions. The attractiveness
of a specific risky activity (e.g., a specific financial investment) is typically evaluated by means of a risk-return
trade-off. Evaluating the performance of a division’s activities in isolation, however, can be very misleading. For
example, the activity might seem highly risky in isolation, but may be useful in hedging risk in other divisions’s
∗Corresponding author: Tel: +31 13 4662373, Fax: +31 13 4663280, Email address: t.j.boonen@uvt.nl, Department of Econometrics
and OR, Tilburg University, CentER for Economic Research and Netspar, PO box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg.
†Department of Accountancy and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, CentER for Economic Research and
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1Alternatively, one can interpret a division as a financial portfolio.
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activities.2 One approach to evaluate the attractiveness of increasing the engagement in the activities of a specific
division taking into account potential hedge effects is to determine the effect of increasing the level of the activities
on the allocation of risk capital to all divisions.
The allocation problem is non-trivial because whenever a coherent risk measure (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and
Heath, 1999) is used to determine risk capital, the amount of risk capital to be withheld for the firm as a whole would
typically be lower than the sum of the amounts of risk capital that would need to be withheld for each division in
isolation. The reason is that the individual risks associated with the divisions are typically not perfectly correlated,
and, hence, there can be some hedge potential from combining the risks. The allocation rule then determines how
the benefits of this hedge potential are allocated to the divisions.
There is a large literature on capital allocation rules, with approaches based on finance (e.g., Tasche, 1999),
optimization (e.g., Dhaene et al., 2003; Laeven and Goovaerts, 2006) and game theory (e.g., Denault, 2001; Tsanakas
and Barnett, 2003; Tsanakas, 2004 and 2009). Our focus in this paper is on game-theoretic approaches to allocating
risk capital. A game-theoretic approach that has received considerable attention is the one of Denault (2001). He
models the risk capital allocation problem as a fuzzy game. Specifically, he defines a risk capital allocation function
as a function that assigns an amount of risk capital to every collection of fractions of divisions. The fraction of
a division included in a collection is referred to as the participation level of that division. He then considers risk
capital allocations that satisfy the stability condition that requires that, for any given collection of fractions of
divisions, the amount of risk capital allocated to that collection is weakly lower than the amount of risk capital
that they would need to withhold if they would separate from the firm. In game-theoretic terms, this condition
means that the allocation is an element of the fuzzy core. Denault specifies a number of other desirable properties
of a risk capital allocation rule, and shows that the Aumann-Shapley value (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) is the
only allocation rule that is in the fuzzy core and satisfies these additional properties.3 Moreover, Kalkbrener (2005)
imposes a diversification axiom that requires the risk capital allocation of a division not to exceed its corresponding
stand-alone risk capital. The Aumann-Shapley value is then characterized as the only allocation rule that satisfies
this condition and two more technical conditions.
The Aumann-Shapley value as a risk capital allocation rule has received considerable attention in the literature.
Financial and economic arguments in favor of the Aumann-Shapley value are provided by, e.g., Tasche (1999) and
Myers and Read (2001). One of the drawbacks, however, of the Aumann-Shapley value is that it requires partial
differentiability of the fuzzy risk capital allocation function at the level of full participation of each division. It is well-
known that the fuzzy risk capital function is generally not differentiable everywhere when the probability distributions
of the risks associated with the divisions are not continuous (see, e.g., Tasche, 1999). We propose a generalization of
the Aumann-Shapley value that is well-defined even when the risk capital function is not differentiable. The rule that
we propose is inspired by the idea underlying the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) for non-fuzzy cooperative games.
We first discretize the participation levels of divisions by considering a finite grid of participation levels. Then, for
any given discrete path on the grid starting from no participation (the participation profile where the participation
level of each division is zero) and ending at full participation (the participation profile with full participation of
each division), we determine the corresponding path-based allocation. Specifically, in each step of the path, the
participation level of exactly one division is increased, and the corresponding difference in risk capital is allocated
to that division. Proceeding in this way along the path, the total risk capital will be allocated once the path reaches
the level of full participation. This procedure yields a risk capital allocation for every possible path. Moreover, the
average of the corresponding risk capital allocations over all possible paths is also a risk capital allocation.4 We
show that when the grid size converges to zero, this average converges as well. The allocation rule that we propose
in this paper equals this asymptotic value. We refer to it as the Weighted-Aumann Shapley value. For risk capital
allocation problems for which the corresponding risk capital function is differentiable at the level of full participation,
the Weighted-Aumann Shapley value coincides with the Aumann-Shapley value. In contrast to the Aumann-Shapley
value, however, the Weighted-Aumann Shapley value is well-defined even when the risk capital allocation function
2An example would be an insurance company that holds both annuities and death benefit insurance. Both types of liabilities are
sensitive to longevity risk (the risk associated with unpredictable changes in survival rates in a population). In isolation, each of these
liabilities could be evaluated as relatively risky. However, the death benefit insurance provides hedge potential for the annuity portfolio.
Van Gulick, De Waegenaere and Norde (2012) show the impact of this hedge potential on the allocation of risk capital.
3For general production functions, the Aumann-Shapley value is characterized by, e.g., Aumann and Shapley (1974), Aubin (1981),
Billera and Heath (1982) and Mirman and Tauman (1982) .




In the seminal book of Aumann and Shapley (1974) the Aumann-Shapley value is introduced and characterized
for special classes of games with a continuum of players. Roughly speaking, the characteristic functions of these
games are obtained as differentiable function of a finite number of non-atomic probability measures. Aumann and
Shapley moreover provide the well-known “diagonal formula” for their value. Mertens (1980 and 1988) extends
the Aumann-Shapley value and its axiomatic characterization to a much larger class of vector measure games by
dropping the differentiability assumption. An overview of the Mertens value for vector measure games is given by
Neyman (2002). Since fuzzy games can be considered as special examples of vector measure games the Aumann
Shapley value can be computed for these games as well under some differentiability assumptions and the Mertens
value under much milder assumptions. In fact, Mertens shows that in order to compute the Mertens value the
Aumann-Shapley diagonal formula should be generalized to a diagonal formula where an expectation of partial
derivatives along random, small perturbations around the diagonal should be integrated.
Aumann and Shapley (1974) show that under very strong assumptions their value (and hence the Mertens
value) can be obtained via an asymptotic approach. However, in Example 19.2 of their book they show that fuzzy
games, corresponding to convex, piecewise affine functions (like the fuzzy games related to risk capital allocation
problems which we consider in this paper), do not satisfy this strong assumption (also pointed out by Neyman and
Smorodinsky, 2004). In this paper we provide an allocation rule that follows a much weaker asymptotic approach
than the one used by Aumann and Shapley (1974). In return, we get that our approach is convergent for all fuzzy
games related to risk capital allocation problems. Moreover, our value happens to coincide with the Mertens value.
By the way, an axiomatization of the Mertens value on the class of piece-wise linear fuzzy games is provided by
Haimanko (2001).
We also show that the corresponding risk capital allocation rule satisfies a number of desirable properties. Some
of these properties are known to be satisfied by the regular Aumann-Shapley value on the class of risk capital
allocation problems for which the Aumann-Shapley value is well-defined. Moreover, the approach that we use to
characterize the allocation rule allows us to give an explicit formula for the corresponding capital allocations. The
specific formula has a geometric interpretation.
This paper is set out as follows. In Section 2, we define risk capital and risk capital allocation problems. Two of
the most prominent game-theoretic solution concepts for allocation problems are discussed in Section 3, namely the
Shapley value and the Aumann-Shapley value. In Section 4, we provide the structure of the risk capital function. In
Section 5 we define a class of path-based allocation rules. In Section 6, we introduce an allocation rule based on the
average of path-based allocations. We show that the corresponding allocation rule can be seen as a generalization of
the Aumann-Shapley value, and that it satisfies some desirable properties. We also provide a closed form expression
with a geometric interpretation.
2 Risk measures and risk capital allocation problems
In this paper, we propose a rule to allocate risk capital among divisions. The firm uses a risk measure to determine
this capital. In this section, we briefly introduce risk measures and risk capital allocation problems.
2.1 Risk measures
In this subsection, we discuss risk measures as in Artzner et al. (1999) and Delbaen (2000). Let (Ω,F ,P) be a
fixed probability space, i.e., Ω is the state space, F is a σ-algebra on Ω and P is the physical probability measure
on (Ω,F). We denote P(Ω,F) as the set of all probability measures on (Ω,F) and L∞(Ω,F ,P) for the space of all
bounded, measurable, real valued stochastic variables. If there is no confusion possible, we write L∞ = L∞(Ω,F ,P).
We interpret a realization of a stochastic variable as a future loss.
A risk measure is a function ρ : L∞ → IR.5 So, a risk measure maps stochastic variables into real numbers. It
serves as a measure to determine the cash reserve for holding risk. The purpose of this reserve is to make the risk
acceptable to the regulator. In this paper, we only focus on coherent risk measures. Coherence is first introduced
by Artzner et al. (1999). A risk measure ρ is called coherent if it satisfies the following four properties:
5Here, we assume that ρ is only defined on L∞. For a discussion of risk measures on the class of all stochastic variables, we refer to
Delbaen (2000).
3
• Sub-additivity: For all X,Y ∈ L∞, we have
ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
• Monotonicity: For all X,Y ∈ L∞ such that X(ω) ≥ Y (ω) holds almost surely for ω ∈ Ω with respect to the
measure P, we have
ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ).
• Positive Homogeneity: For every X ∈ L∞ and every c > 0, we have
ρ(c ·X) = c · ρ(X).
• Translation Invariance: For every X ∈ L∞ and every c ∈ IR, we have
ρ(X + c · eΩ) = ρ(X) + c,
where eΩ ∈ L∞ is such that eΩ(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω.
The relevance of these properties is widely discussed by Artzner et al. (1999). Furthermore, the following property
of a risk measure ρ has been defined by, e.g., Delbaen (2000):
• Comonotonic Additivity: For all X,Y ∈ L∞ such that X and Y are comonotone, we have that
ρ(X + Y ) = ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
Random variables X and Y are comonotone if the inequality [X(ω1) −X(ω2)] · [Y (ω1) − Y (ω2)] ≥ 0 holds almost
surely for (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω × Ω with respect to the product measure P × P (e.g., Delbaen, 2000). If a risk measure
satisfies Comonotonic Additivity, it means that if stochastic variables are “perfectly” dependent, there is no benefit
from pooling.
Artzner et al. (1999) and Delbaen (2000) show that a risk measure ρ is coherent if and only if there exists a set
of probability measures Q ⊂ P(Ω,F) such that6
ρ(X) = sup {EQ[X ] : Q ∈ Q} , for all X ∈ L∞. (1)
The set Q need not be unique. We will refer to a set Q that satisfies (1) as a generating probability measure set of
ρ. Moreover, Delbaen (2000) shows that for every coherent risk measure ρ satisfying Comonotonic Additivity, there
is a submodular function υρ : F → IR+ with υρ(∅) = 0 and υρ(Ω) = 1 such that the following set Q is generating
ρ:78
Q = {Q ∈ P(Ω,F) : Q(A) ≥ υρ(A) for all A ∈ F} . (2)
In all examples of this paper, we focus on a special class of coherent risk measures satisfying Comonotonic
Additivity. This class is the class distortion risk measures (Wang, 1995) with a distortion function gρ.9 It can be
shown that, subject to a technical condition, any coherent risk measure satisfying Comonotonic Additivity can be
represented by a distortion risk measure (Wang, Panjer and Young, 1997).
6This result is shown by Artzner et al. (1999) in case of a finite state space and generalized by Delbaen (2000) to stochastic variables
on L∞.
7This result is deduced by Delbaen (2000) from earlier results of Denneberg (1994) and Schmeidler (1986).
8A function υ : F → IR is submodular if υ(S ∪ T ) + υ(S ∩ T ) ≥ υ(S) + υ(T ) for all S, T ∈ F .
9Distortion risk measures are given by ρ(X) =
∫∞
0




(gρ(P(X > x)) − 1)dx for all X ∈ L∞, where gρ is a
continuous, concave and increasing function such that gρ(0) = 0 and gρ(1) = 1. Here, convergence is guaranteed by boundedness of X.
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Example 2.1 For distortion risk measures, Denneberg (1994) shows that a function υρ satisfying (2) is given by
υρ(A) = 1− gρ(1 − P(A)), for all A ∈ F , (3)
where gρ is the distortion function.10 So, a function υρ as in (2) has a known functional form that is only dependent
on the function gρ and the probability space. Substituting (3) in (2) yields the following generating probability measure
set of ρ:
Q = {Q ∈ P(Ω,F) : Q(A) ≤ gρ(P(A)) for all A ∈ F} . (4)
Next, we discuss a well-known coherent risk measure. We use this measure in all examples in this paper. The
risk measure Expected Shortfall (e.g., Acerbi and Tasche, 2002) is defined as follows.11 Let α ∈ (0, 1). The (1− α)-
quantile is defined by
q1−α(X) = sup{x ∈ IR : P({ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) ≥ x}) > α}, for all X ∈ L∞. (5)
Then, the risk measure Expected Shortfall with significance level α ∈ (0, 1) is defined as
ρESα (X) = α
−1(EP
[
X · 1X≥q1−α(X)]− q1−α(X) · (P[X ≥ q1−α(X)]− α)), for all X ∈ L∞. (6)
Note that if X is continuously distributed, we have ρESα (X) = E [X : X ≥ q1−α(X)]. Tasche (2002) shows that this
risk measure ρ is coherent and, moreover, that it satisfies Comonotonic Additivity.
Dhaene et al. (2006) show that Expected Shortfall with significance level α ∈ (0, 1) is a distortion risk measure
and its distortion function is given by
gρ
ES






If the state space Ω is finite and the σ-algebra F equals its power set, we can replace the event A ∈ F in expression
(4) by state ω ∈ Ω. This holds since g(x) is linear for x ≤ α and Q(A) ≤ 1 for all Q ∈ P(Ω,F) and for all A ∈ F .
Hence, in this case, the generating probability measure set of ρESα from (4) is given by
Q =
{
Q ∈ P(Ω,F) : Q({ω}) ≤ P({ω})
α
for all ω ∈ Ω
}
. (8)
In Example 2.4, we will discuss this probability measure set in more detail. ▽
Next, we introduce a special class of risk measures. In this paper, we consider risk measures that are finitely
generated, i.e., the risk measure has a finite generating probability measure set Q.
Definition 2.2 A coherent risk measure ρ : L∞(Ω,F ,P) → IR is finitely generated if there exists a finite generating
probability measure set Q ⊂ P(Ω,F), i.e.,
ρ(X) = max {EQ [X ] : Q ∈ Q} , for all X ∈ L∞. (9)
Again, we note that this set Q need not be uniquely determined.
The condition in Definition 2.2 on coherent risk measures seems quite restrictive. However, we show that all
coherent risk measures satisfying Comonotonic Additivity satisfy this property in case the state space is finite.
Proposition 2.3 If the state space Ω is finite and the risk measure ρ is coherent and satisfies Comonotonic Addi-
tivity, then ρ is finitely generated.
10This result is shown by Denneberg (1994) for Choquet integrals. The distortion risk measure is an example of a Choquet integral.
11The risk measure Expected Shortfall is also referred by other authors as Worst Conditional Expectation (e.g., Artzner et al., 1999),
Conditional VaR or Tail VaR (e.g., Dhaene et al., 2006).
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Proof Let Q be the generating probability measure set of ρ that is defined in (2), i.e.,
Q = {Q ∈ P(Ω,F) : Q(A) ≥ υρ(A) for all A ∈ F} ,
where υρ : F → IR+ is submodular, υρ(∅) = 0 and υρ(Ω) = 1. Note that as the state space Ω is finite, the σ-algebra
F is finite as well. Because F is finite, Q is defined via a finite number of linear inequalities on [0, 1]Ω. So, Q is a
convex polytope. Let Q̃ be the finite collection of extreme points of this convex polytope. Because Q → EQ[X ] is a
linear map on Q for every X ∈ L∞, (1) is a linear programming problem and, therefore, we have
ρ(X) = sup {EQ [X ] : Q ∈ Q} = max
{
EQ [X ] : Q ∈ Q̃
}
, for all X ∈ L∞.
Hence, ρ(X) equals the maximum of all expectations of X under the probability measures in Q̃. Hence, Q̃ is a
generating probability measure set. This concludes the proof. 
A finitely generated risk measure, however, does not need to satisfy Comonotonic Additivity. As a main example,
Expected Shortfall belongs to the class of finitely generated risk measures if Ω is finite.
In the next example, we provide an explicit expression for a specific finite generating probability measure set
corresponding to Proposition 2.3.
Example 2.4 Let the state space Ω be finite, the σ-algebra F equal its power set and the risk measure ρ be a coherent
risk measure satisfying Comonotonic Additivity. Recall the generating probability measure set in (2). Let σ be an
order on Ω, i.e., σ : {1, . . . , |Ω|} → Ω is the bijective function that corresponds with a permutation on the state space.
The state at position j ∈ {1, . . . , |Ω|} in the order σ is denoted by σ(j) ∈ Ω and the set of all orders on the state













, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , |Ω|}. (10)
The stochastic variable mσ is a probability measure on (Ω,F) due to submodularity and non-negativity of υρ, υρ(∅) =















 , for all σ ∈ Π(Ω) and j ∈ {1, . . . , |Ω|}. (11)
Then, the following set is a generating probability measure set of ρ:
Q = {mσ : σ ∈ Π(Ω)} . (12)
This result follows almost directly from the proof of Proposition 2.3.12
Next, we provide an example of the construction of (12). Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. If the state space is finite,









and ρ = ρES0.1 . Using (11) with g





for all x ∈ [0, 1], we obtain the following outcomes of
(mσ(ω1),m
σ(ω2),m
σ(ω3)) for all σ ∈ Π(Ω):
σ ω1 ω2 ω3
ω1 ω2 ω3 0 0 1
ω1 ω3 ω2 0 1 0











ω3 ω1 ω2 0 1 0
12Suppose (Ω, υρ) is a Transferable Utility game, where Ω is the corresponding “player” set. In game-theoretical terms, the represen-
tation (2) of a finite generating probability measure set coincides with the core of the game (Ω, υρ). Then, submodularity of the function
υρ is equivalent with convexity of the corresponding game (Shapley, 1971). Shapley (1971) shows that the core of convex games coincides
with the convex hull of the marginal vectors. A marginal vector corresponds with a vector mσ . All extreme points of the core of (Ω, υρ)
are in (12).
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Hence, according to (12), a finite generating probability measure set of ρES0.1 is given by















. Recall that the elements of Q are the extreme
points of the set in (8). ▽
Throughout the sequel of this paper, we fix for a given finitely generated risk measure ρ a finite generating probability
measure set, which we denote by Q(ρ). This assumption is without loss of generality.
2.2 Risk capital allocation problems
In this section, we discuss risk capital allocation problems as in, e.g., Denault (2001). Consider a firm, for example a
pension fund or an insurance company. This firm consists of multiple divisions that face risk. The risk of a division
is summarized by a stochastic loss variable at a common future time. The problem is to allocate the total risk among
all divisions.
The finite set of all divisions within a firm is denoted by N . Throughout this paper, we fix N and the probability
space (Ω,F ,P). We denote for each division i ∈ N the stochastic loss as Xi ∈ L∞. The total loss of the firm is
given by
∑
i∈N Xi. We assume that the risk capital of the firm is measured using a coherent risk measure ρ. In the
following definition, we define the risk capital allocation problem.
Definition 2.5 A risk capital allocation problem is a tuple ((Xi)i∈N , ρ), where Xi ∈ L∞ for all i ∈ N and ρ is a
finitely generated risk measure. The class of all risk capital allocation problems is denoted by R.
In the following definition, we define the concept of risk capital allocations and risk capital allocation rules.







. Let R̃ ⊆ R be a (sub)domain of risk capital allocation problems. We define a risk capital allocation
rule as a function K : R̃ → IRN that assigns to every risk capital allocation problem R ∈ R̃ a unique risk capital









, for all R ∈ R̃.
The Sub-additivity property of coherent risk measures implies that there can be benefits from pooling risks. Specif-











This property implies that allocating risk capital among divisions is generally non-trivial. The aim is to allocate the
gains from pooling risk in a fair way.
Based on Denault (2001), we define the following properties of a risk capital allocation rule K : R̃ → IRN :
• Translation Invariance: For all R = ((Xi)i∈N , ρ) ∈ R̃, it holds that if R̂ = ((X̂i)i∈N , ρ) ∈ R̃ where (X̂i)i∈N =
(Xj + c · eΩ, X−j) for some c ∈ IR and j ∈ N , then
K(R̂) = K(R) + c · ej ,
where ej is the j-th unit vector in IR
N .
• Scale Invariance: For all R = ((Xi)i∈N , ρ) ∈ R̃, it holds that if R̂ = ((X̂i)i∈N , ρ) ∈ R̃ where (X̂i)i∈N =
(c ·Xi)i∈N for some c > 0, then
K(R̂) = c ·K(R).
7










whenever λ, λ∗ ∈ [0, 1]N and λ ≤ λ∗, we have
K(R) ≥ 0.
• Fuzzy Core Selection: For all R ∈ R̃, we have
K(R) ∈ FCore(R), for all R ∈ R̃,
where FCore(R) denotes the fuzzy core (Aubin, 1979), which is defined as:13
FCore(R) =
{



















In particular, the property Fuzzy Core Selection is widely discussed in the game-theoretic literature on risk capital
allocation problems (see, e.g., Denault, 2001; Tsanakas and Barnett, 2003). For an allocation in the fuzzy core, no
portfolio of fractional risks would have a lower stand-alone risk capital than the corresponding risk capital allocation.
This property ensures a stable allocation.
3 The Shapley value and the Aumann-Shapley value
In this section, we discuss cooperative game-theoretic solution concepts for risk capital allocation problems. There
is one particular solution concept that has received considerable attention in cooperative game theory, namely the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). The following definition defines the Shapley value for risk capital allocation problems.























for all R ∈ R and i ∈ N , where |S| denotes the number of divisions in S ⊆ N and
w(|S|) = |S|! · (|N | − |S| − 1)!|N |! .
The Shapley value is originally defined for Transferable Utility games and is here applied to the atomic risk capital
cost game of Denault (2001).14 The Shapley value can be interpreted as the average of all marginal vectors. Given
an ordering of divisions, a marginal vector is created by assigning to every division its marginal contribution if they
enter the coalition one-by-one according to the order. The weight w(|S|) assigned to a marginal contribution of
division i to a coalition S represents the “probability” that in a uniformly random ordering of divisions, all divisions
in S are on the first positions and thereafter is division i.
It is easy to show that the Shapley value is a risk capital allocation rule. Denault (2001) shows that the Shapley
value does not satisfy the stability criterium that, in game-theoretical terms, means that the Shapley value may not
yield a core element. This is seen as a major drawback of the Shapley value for risk capital allocation problems.
Aumann and Shapley (1974) developed an allocation rule for general cost functions. This is given in the following
definition.






(γ · eN )dγ, for all i ∈ N, (16)
whenever these integrals exist, and where eN is the unit vector in IR
N .
13Aubin (1979) shows that the fuzzy core is non-empty, convex and compact since ρ satisfies Sub-additivity and Positive Homogeneity.
14Denault (2001) defines the atomic risk capital game (N, c) as c(S) = ρ(
∑
i∈S Xi) for all S ⊆ N .
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The Aumann-Shapley value can be interpreted as the average of the marginal changes of the risk capital function r
if the participation of all divisions increases simultaneously.
Denault (2001) applies the Aumann-Shapley value to risk capital allocation problems. The risk capital function







, for all λ ∈ [0, 1]N . (17)
The interpretation is as follows. Here, divisions are allowed to participate fractionally. The participation level for
division i ∈ N , denoted by λi ∈ [0, 1], can be seen as the fractional involvement of division i in a coalition. Here,
the maximal participation level of every division is normalized to one.15 Moreover, we define a participation profile
λ ∈ [0, 1]N as a collection of participation levels of all divisions in N . Note that the risk capital of the firm is given
by r(eN ) = ρ(
∑
i∈N Xi).
Since the risk measure ρ satisfies Positive Homogeneity, we can simplify expression (16) as in the following
corollary of, e.g., Denault (2001).





(eN ), for all i ∈ N, (18)
where the risk capital function r is as in (17) and R′ ⊂ R is defined as the set of all risk capital allocation problems
for which r is partially differentiable at λ = eN .
The Aumann-Shapley value for risk capital allocation problems is the gradient of the risk capital function evaluated
in the vector of full participation. As we focus on risk capital allocation problems in this paper, we will continue by
referring to AS as the Aumann-Shapley value.
We discuss the main game-theoretic argument why the Aumann-Shapley value is widely supported as allocation
rule for risk capital. This property involves the fuzzy core that is defined in (15). Allocations in the fuzzy core are
derived on the premise that every fuzzy portfolio should be allocated less than its stand-alone risk capital, i.e., no
fuzzy coalition λ has an incentive to split off from the firm. The following theorem about the relationship between
the fuzzy core and the Aumann-Shapley value is due to Denault, which is based on an earlier result of Aubin (1979).
Theorem 3.4 (Denault, 2001, Theorem 7, page 20) For all R ∈ R′, the fuzzy core FCore(R) consists of only
one element. This single-valued fuzzy core element is the Aumann-Shapley value.
The worst-case probability measures for the firm is defined as follows:
Q∗(ρ) =
{







The following theorem provides an expression of the fuzzy core. This is based on Aubin (1979, Proposition 4, page
343).
Theorem 3.5 Let R ∈ R. Then, we have
FCore(R) = conv{(EQ[Xi])i∈N : Q ∈ Q∗(ρ)},
where conv denotes the convex hull operator and Q∗(ρ) is defined in (19).
15This normalization is contrary to the approach of Denault (2001), but it is without loss of generality.
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Next, we can reformulate the Aumann-Shapley value from (18). It follows from Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5 that
the Aumann-Shapley value for division i ∈ N , if well-defined, is given by the expectation of Xi under the worst-case
probability measure Q ∈ Q∗(ρ), i.e.,
ASi(R) = EQ[Xi], for all R ∈ R′, i ∈ N and Q ∈ Q∗(ρ). (20)
If there exists a division i and Q, Q̃ ∈ Q∗(ρ) such that EQ[Xi] 6= EQ̃[Xi], then the Aumann-Shapley value does not
exist. Moreover, the following result is based on a characterization of the Aumann-Shapley value of Denault (2001).
Theorem 3.6 (Denault, 2001, Corollary 1, page 20) The Aumann-Shapley value satisfies the properties Trans-
lation Invariance, Scale Invariance and Monotonicity on R′.
Next, we provide an example about the construction of the Aumann-Shapley value.
Example 3.7 Recall the probability space (Ω,F ,P) from Example 2.4. Let N = {1, 2}. If the state space is finite,















 , and, again, ρ = ρESα .
The corresponding risk capital function r, which is defined in (17), is given by
r(λ1, λ2) =
{
λ1 + 4λ2 if 2λ2 ≥ λ1,
4λ1 − 2λ2 otherwise, (21)











Figure 1: Plot of r(λ1, λ2) corresponding to (21).
where the risk capital function r is not partially differentiable are located on a straight line through the origin. It







is the unique probability measure in Q∗(ρES0.1 ) from (19). Hence, using (20), the
Aumann-Shapley value is given by
AS(R) = (EQ[X1], EQ[X2]) = (1, 4).
▽
The main drawback of the Aumann-Shapley value is that it requires partial differentiability of the risk capital
function. In Section 6, we extend the Aumann-Shapley value such that it is always well-defined.
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4 Fuzzy risk capital allocation functions
In this section, we analyze the structure of the risk capital function r, which is defined in (17). We show that it is
piecewise linear and almost everywhere partially differentiable. We also introduce some notation that we need in
Section 6, where we define an allocation rule.




λi · EQ[Xi], for all λ ∈ IRN .
Note that it is possible that different measures Q ∈ Q(ρ) yield the same function fQ.
Proposition 4.2 For all R ∈ R, the risk capital function r is piecewise linear on [0, 1]N .















λi · EQ [Xi] : Q ∈ Q(ρ)
}
= max{fQ(λ) : Q ∈ Q(ρ)}, (22)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1]N . This concludes the proof. 
From (22) follows that for every λ ∈ [0, 1]N , there exists at least one Q ∈ Q(ρ) such that r(λ) = fQ(λ).
Next, we define the set of participation profiles corresponding to a probability measure in Q(ρ) where this measure
is the worst case probability measure.




λ ∈ [0, 1]N : r(λ) = fQ(λ)
}
.
Moreover, we define and order K1, . . . ,Kp, p
∗ ≤ p and Q1, . . . ,Qp ∈ Q(ρ) such that:
• K1, . . . ,Kp is an exhaustive list of the elements of {AQ : Q ∈ Q(ρ)} without repetitions;
• Km = AQm for all m ∈ {1, . . . , p};
• eN ∈ Km for m ∈ {1, . . . , p∗} and eN /∈ Km otherwise.
It is straightforward to show that Km is a closed and convex polytope (in fact, a pointed cone). Define e∅ as the
zero vector in IRN . The participation profile λ = e∅ is an element of Km for all m ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Moreover, we have
p⋃
m=1
Km = [0, 1]
N , (23)
and p ≤ |Q(ρ)|.
Example 4.4 In this example, we illustrate Definition 4.3. Recall the probability space (Ω,F ,P),the risk capi-
tal allocation problem from Example 3.7 and Q1, . . . ,Q4 from Example 2.4. The ordering of Q1, . . . ,Q4 corre-
sponds with Definition 4.3. Based on this definition, we get K1 = AQ1 =
{
λ ∈ [0, 1]N : λ1 ≤ 2λ2
}
, K2 = AQ2 ={
λ ∈ [0, 1]N : λ1 ≥ 2λ2
}
and K3 = AQ3 = AQ4 =
{
λ ∈ [0, 1]N : λ1 = 2λ2
}
. Note that fQ3 = fQ4 and, so, it is without
loss of generality to drop Q4. ▽
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Next, we focus on partial differentiability of the risk capital function r. Partial differentiability is a key issue for
existence of the Aumann-Shapley value (see Corollary 3.3) and, moreover, it is key in the risk capital allocation rule
that we define in Section 6.
Definition 4.5 Let R ∈ R. Then, the set L(R) is given by
L(R) =
{
λ ∈ [0, 1]N : there exists a unique m ∈ {1, . . . , p} such that λ ∈ Km
}
.
The set L(R) is open on [0, 1]N and, therefore, L(R) is a the set of participation profiles where risk capital function
r is locally linear. So, for all λ ∈ L(R)∩Km, there exists a neighborhood U ⊂ [0, 1]N of λ such that r(λ̂) = fQm(λ̂)
for all λ̂ ∈ U and, so,
∂r
∂λi
(λ) = EQm [Xi], for all i ∈ N. (24)
Hence, L(R) is a set of participation profiles in [0, 1]N on which the risk capital function r is partially differentiable.16
Note that p∗ = 1 if and only if the function r is partially differentiable in λ = eN .
Lemma 4.6 For all R ∈ R, the collection of profiles where the risk capital function r is not partially differentiable
is a subset of a collection of a finite number of hyperplanes passing trough λ = e∅.
Proof We obtain for all ℓ,m ∈ {1, . . . , p} that
Kℓ ∩Km =
{








λ ∈ [0, 1]N :
∑
i∈N
λi · (EQℓ [Xi]− EQm [Xi]) = 0
}
. (25)
If EQℓ [Xi] = EQm [Xi] for all i ∈ N , we have Kℓ = Km which implies ℓ = m. So, the set Kℓ ∩ Km is a (possibly





Kℓ ∩Km, for all R ∈ R. (26)
From this follows that the collection of profiles where the risk capital function r is not partially differentiable is a
subset of the collection of a finite number of hyperplanes passing trough λ = e∅. 
From this lemma, we get that the set L(R) has a full measure on [0, 1]N . So, we obtain immediately the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.7 For all R ∈ R, the risk capital function r is almost everywhere partially differentiable.
In the sequel of this paper, we use the risk capital function r for defining an allocation rule in Section 6. We will
need the results in Lemma 4.6 and Corollary 4.7 in Subsection 6.2.
5 Path based allocation rules
In this section, we discuss path based allocation rules as introduced by Wang (1999). We construct an allocation
based on the idea of the marginal vectors of the Shapley value. We extend this idea to a problem where divisions
16The set L(R) is not necessary the set of all participation profiles where r is partially differentiable as if λi = 0 for some division i,
there may be multiple m such that λ ∈ Km even though r may be partially differentiable.
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can participate fractionally via a finite set of participation levels. We first describe this allocation rule informally
and, thereafter, we provide a formal definition.









, . . . , 1
}N
. (27)
The starting point on grid Gn is the participation profile e∅ in which the participation level of each division is zero.
In the first step the participation level of some division i is increased by 1n and the corresponding difference in risk
capital, r ((1/n) · ei) − r(e∅), is allocated to division i. In the second step of the path again the participation level
of some division (not necessarily the same as the one in the first step) is increased by 1n and the risk change is
allocated to this division. Proceeding in this way, we will end up after |N |n steps in eN and risk capital r(eN ) has
been allocated to the divisions by then.
Formally, we define a path in the following way.
Definition 5.1 Let n ∈ IN. A path on the grid Gn is a map P : {0, 1, 2, . . . , |N |n} → Gn satisfying:
1. P (0) = e∅ and P (|N |n) = eN ;
2. for every k ∈ {0, . . . , |N |n− 1} there exists a unique i ∈ N such that
P (k + 1)− P (k) = 1
n
· ei. (28)
This unique division i will be denoted as i(P, k).
An example of a path P on the grid Gn is given in Figure 2. We denote the collection of all paths over the grid Gn








Figure 2: Example of a path P ∈ Pn for |N | = 2 with n = 10. We connected succeeding elements of the path as
illustration.
to the corresponding divisions. Formally, we define this allocation rule as follows.




[r(P (k + 1))− r(P (k))] · ei(P,k), for all R ∈ R,
where the risk capital function r is defined in (17).
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Proposition 5.3 For every P ∈ Pn, AP is an allocation rule on R.



















[r(P (k + 1))− r(P (k))] (31)
= r(P (|N |n)) − r(P (0))
= r(eN ), (32)
where 1i(P,k)=i = 1 if i(P, k) = i and 1i(P,k)=i = 0 otherwise. Here, (29) follows from Definition 5.2, (30) follows by
interchanging the summations, (31) follows from the fact that there is precisely one i ∈ N such that i(P, k) = i for
all k ∈ {0, . . . , |N |n− 1} and (32) follows from Definition 5.1.1. This concludes the proof. 
We will refer to AP as a path based allocation rule. Next, we show some general properties of path based allocation
rules.
Theorem 5.4 For every P ∈ Pn, the allocation rule AP satisfies the properties Translation Invariance, Scale
Invariance and Monotonicity on R.
Proof We start with showing the property Translation Invariance. Let P ∈ Pn, j ∈ N , R = ((Xi)i∈N , ρ) ∈ R and
R̂ = ((X̂i)i∈N , ρ) ∈ R such that (X̂i)i∈N = (Xj + c · eΩ, X−j) for some c ∈ IR. Moreover, we let the risk capital



















+ c · λj (33)
= r(λ) + c · λj , (34)








[r(P (k + 1)) + c · Pj(k + 1)− r(P (k)) − c · Pj(k)] · ei(P,k) (36)
= AP (R) + c ·
|N |n−1∑
k=0
[Pj(k + 1)− Pj(k)] · ei(P,k) (37)
= AP (R) + c ·
|N |n−1∑
k=0
[Pj(k + 1)− Pj(k)] · ej (38)
14
= AP (R) + c · [Pj(|N |n)− Pj(0)] · ej
= AP (R) + c · ej , (39)
where Pj(k) is the j-th element of P (k). Here, (35) follows from Definition 5.2, (36) follows from (118), (37) follows
from Definition 5.2, (38) follows from Pj(k+1)−Pj(k) = 0 if i(P, k) 6= j (see (28)) and (39) follows from Definition
5.1.1. This concludes the proof of Translation Invariance.
The proof of Scale Invariance is similar to the proof of Translation Invariance.
Next, we show Monotonicity. Let the risk measure ρ be non-decreasing. This implies r(P (k + 1))− r(P (k)) ≥ 0
for all k ∈ {0, . . . , |N |n− 1}. Then, from Definition 5.2 it follows directly that AP (R) ≥ 0. This concludes the proof
of Monotonicity. 
Compare this result with Theorem 3.6. Denault (2001) shows that there exists an allocation rule satisfying the above-
mentioned properties and that the Aumann-Shapley value is such a rule. Using Theorem 5.4, we extend this result
for all allocation rules based on a path. Moreover, one can verify using Positive Homogeneity and Sub-additivity of
ρ that a path based allocation rule always satisfies the following bounds:
min{EQ[Xi] : Q ∈ Q(ρ)} ≤ APi (R) ≤ ρ(Xi),
for all P ∈ Pn, R = ((Xi)i∈N , ρ) ∈ R and i ∈ N . So, every path based allocation is individually rational and is
always weakly more than the expectation of Xi under the best-case probability measure.
We can approximate expression (16) of the Aumann-Shapley value (if existent) using a very small grid and a
path close to the diagonal. Note that the Aumann-Shapley value is not defined if the risk capital function r is not
partially differentiable along the diagonal. As a solution, we propose a generalization based on paths that is not
prone to this problem in the next section.
6 The Weighted-Aumann Shapley value
6.1 A sequence of discrete rules
In this section we introduce a generalization of the well-known Aumann-Shapley value. In line with the Shapley
value (1953), we define an allocation rule based on the average of all path based allocation rules corresponding to
paths on a finite grid, i.e., average of AP for all P ∈ Pn for some n. Then, we let the grid size converge to zero. We
will show that the limit of the corresponding allocation rules exists and that it is a well-defined value also in case
of non-differentiability of the risk capital function r. We show that in case of differentiability the outcome is the
standard Aumann-Shapley value. In case of non-differentiability however, the outcome can be regarded as a weighted
average of standard Aumann-Shapley values for “nearby” risk capital allocation problems with a differentiable risk
capital function. Moreover we will provide a geometric interpretation of the corresponding weights. We will refer to
this value as the Weighted-Aumann Shapley value.
In Definition 5.2 we introduced an allocation rule based on a path P ∈ Pn. Since AP is a risk capital allocation
rule (see Proposition 5.3), the average of all path based risk capital allocation rules is a risk capital allocation rule
itself. This allocation rule is defined as follows.






AP (R), for all R ∈ R, (40)
where AP is defined in Definition 5.2.
For a given n, one can rewrite the definition of Kn to the standard Aumann-Shapley method, which is proposed
by Moulin (1995) for a given discrete production problem with a continuously differentiable production function. If
n = 1, this allocation rule equals the Shapley value, i.e., K1 = S. The asymptotic behavior of Kn(R) when n → ∞
(or, equivalently, when the grid size converges to 0) is a central topic of this paper. Next, we rewrite Kn(R) as a
weighted sum of marginal contributions over all participation profiles on the grid Gn.
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λi, for all λ ∈ IRN , (44)
and where the risk capital function r is defined in (17).
Proof We provide the proof in Appendix A. 
The function tn(λ) represents the probability that λ lies on a path, if we randomly select a path from Pn according
to the discrete uniform distribution. Moreover, pni (λ) is the conditional probability that λ + (1/n) · ei lies on
a path, provided that the path passes through λ. So, in order to compute Kni (R), each marginal contribution
r(λ + (1/n) · ei)− r(λ) is multiplied by the probability that both λ and λ+ (1/n) · ei are on a path.
We will show in the sequel that limn→∞ K
n(R) exists if R ∈ R. This enables us to define the Weighted-Aumann
Shapley value WAS : R → IRN by
WAS(R) = lim
n→∞
Kn(R), for all R ∈ R. (45)
Moreover, we will show that this allocation rule satisfies WAS(R) = AS(R) in case the risk capital function r is
partially differentiable in eN . So, K
1 is the Shapley value and limn→∞ K
n the Aumann-Shapley value, if existent.
Moreover, in case of non-differentiability, we show that the Weighted Aumann-Shapley value is a weighted average
of standard Aumann-Shapley values of “nearby” risk capital allocation problems where the risk capital function is
partially differentiable.
6.2 Convergence
In this subsection, we provide our main result of this paper. We show that the Weighted Aumann-Shapley value
exists and provide a closed form solution. We use the following notation throughout this subsection:
• We use the Bachmann-Landau notation. Let f, g : IN → IR be two real-valued functions. Then, we write
f(n) = O(g(n)) if there is a K > 0 such that |f(n)| ≤ K · |g(n)| for every n ∈ IN. If f : IN → IR is such that
f(n) = O(n−p) for every p > 0, we write f(n) = O(n−∞). Moreover, if g : IR++ → IR is such that there is a
K > 0 such that |g(ε)| ≤ K · ε for every ε > 0, we write g(ε) = O(ε). Here, IR++ = (0,∞) is the set of all
positive, real numbers.
• Let f : IR++× IN → IR and g : IN → IR. Then, we write f(ε, n) = Oε(g(n)) if for every ε > 0, there is a Kε > 0
such that |f(ε, n)| ≤ Kε · |g(n)| for all n ∈ IN. This notation is an extension of the standard Bachmann-Landau
notation.
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i as the Euclidean norm of λ.
• We define the set of participation profiles that are not nearby λ = e∅ and eN as follows. For all n ∈ IN and
ε > 0, we define
Gε =
{






where λ̄ is defined in (44).
• We define Dd as the set of participation profiles in the d-environment of the diagonal, i.e., for all d > 0, we
have
Dd = {λ ∈ [0, 1]N : ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖ < d}.
Moreover, we define for all n ∈ IN the set




In Figure 3, we provide an illustration of th sets Gε and D
d in case of two divisions. We will only consider
participation profiles in Gε for an arbitrary choice of ε > 0. In the following proposition, we approximate the
weight functions tn and pni that are defined in Proposition 6.2. For large n, we obtain expressions with a nice
interpretation, which are obtained using, among others, several Taylor and Stirling approximations. We get that













Figure 3: The shaded set is a set of participation profiles with substantial aggregate contribution to the Weighted
Aumann-Shapley value (see Lemma C.1 and Lemma C.2) in case |N | = 2. Here, I ∪II = [0, 1]N\Gε and III ∪IV =
Gε\D(n) for an arbitrary choice of ε > 0 and n ∈ IN.






· b(n, λ̄) · [1 +Oε(n− 14 )], if λ ∈ D(n), (46)








|N | · [1 +O
ε(n−
1
4 )], if λ ∈ D(n), (48)
O(1), if λ /∈ D(n), (49)
for all (ε, n, λ) ∈ Dom, where
c(λ̄) =
1
2λ̄(1− λ̄) > 0, (50)
and
b(n, λ̄) = (2πn)
1
2 (1−|N |) ·
√
|N | · (λ̄(1− λ̄)) 12 (1−|N |). (51)
Proof We provide the proof in Appendix B. 
For large n, we get that tn(λ) only depends on λ via λ̄ and ‖λ − λ̄ · eN‖ and that pni (λ) is symmetric close to the
diagonal. For a given n ∈ IN and λ̄ ∈
{
0, 1n , . . . , 1
}
, the function b(n, λ̄) is approximately the probability that a
path goes through the diagonal (i.e., through λ̄ · eN ) and c(λ̄) indicates a speed at which tn(λ) converges to zero
for participation profiles away from the diagonal. The function tn(λ) is exponentially small in n if λ is not nearby
to the diagonal, i.e., λ /∈ D(n). Moreover, pni (λ) is bounded. Therefore, only participation profiles very close to the
diagonal are relevant for Kn if n converges to infinity. From Proposition 6.3, we obtain that tn(λ) · pni (λ) can be
approximated for λ nearby the diagonal using the following formula.






· b(n, λ̄) · 1|N | ,
for all λ ∈ [0, 1]N\{e∅, eN} and n ∈ IN, where c(λ̄) is defined in (50) and b(n, λ̄) in (51).
From Proposition 6.3, we get that
tn(λ) · pni (λ) = hn(λ) · [1 +Oε(n−
1
4 )], (52)
for all (ε, n, λ) ∈ Dom such that λ ∈ D(n).
In Lemma C.1 and Lemma C.2, we show that all participation profiles in Gn that are not close to the diagonal
or that are nearby e∅ or eN have a negligible aggregate contribution to K
n if n converges to infinity. In case of two
divisions, we illustrate these participation profiles in Figure 3. We obtain that all participation profiles in Km for
m /∈ {1, . . . , p∗} have a negligible aggregate contribution.
From Corollary 4.7, we get that the risk capital function r is almost everywhere partially differentiable. In
Lemma C.6, we extent this result by showing that participation profiles in a 1n -environment of participation profiles
where r is non-differentiable have a negligible aggregate contribution for large n as well. For all other risk profiles
λ, we obtain from (24) that




for all i ∈ N and λ ∈ Gn∩Km such that λi < 1 and m ∈ {1, . . . , p}. So, for these risk profiles, we know the marginal
effect exactly.


















and p∗, Qm and Km are defined in Definition 4.3.
Proof We provide the proof in Appendix C. 
The expression φn,εm is a weight for a gradient of the risk capital function r “nearby” the diagonal, namely (EQm [Xi])i∈N .
Next, we show that we can replace this weight by an expression that has a geometric interpretation and is not de-
pendent on n or ε anymore. This result is obtained by replacing the sum in (53) by an integral (see Lemma D.2 and
Lemma D.3) and, thereafter, solving this integral.




EQm [Xi] · φm +O(ε) +Oε(n−
1
4 ), for all i ∈ N,
where for all m ∈ {1, . . . , p∗} we define
S =
{
z ∈ IRN :
∑
i∈N














where µ is the surface area measure on S and the function fQ is defined in Definition 4.1.
Proof We provide the proof in Appendix D. 
Remark that from Lemma 4.6, we get
p∗∑
m=1
φm = 1. (54)
Recall the definition of the Weighted Aumann-Shapley value in (45). Using Proposition 6.6, we next show that this
value exists and, moreover, we provide a closed form expression. This result is given in the following theorem.




EQm [Xi] · φm, for all i ∈ N,
with φm as defined in Proposition 6.6.





EQm [Xi] · φm
∣∣∣∣∣∣
< K · ε+ Lε · n−
1
4 , where K,Lε > 0.
19









EQm [Xi] · φm
∣∣∣∣∣∣
< η.
This concludes the proof. 
Theorem 6.7 shows that the Weighted Aumann-Shapley value is a convex combination of regular Aumann-Shapley
values of “nearby” risk capital allocation problems. The weight φm has a geometric interpretation, as we will show
in the next constructive example.
Example 6.8 In this example, we discuss a case with three divisions. Let N = {1, 2, 3} Ω = {ω1, . . . , ω5} and

































Next, we show the value of φm. We pick out the colored triangle T := {λ ∈ [0, 1]N : λ̄ = 13} as in Figure 4.
(0, 0, 0)
(1, 1, 1)
Figure 4: A representation of the path via the diagonal for N = {1, 2, 3} in [0, 1]N . The colored area is the set
T :=
{
λ ∈ [0, 1]N : λ̄ = 13
}
.
The set T \L(R) is a union of line segments on the triangle T . This set contains all participation profiles in T
where the risk capital function r is non-differentiable. Let Qm = (1ωm , 0−ωm) for m ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. We display the
set (T ∩Km)m∈{1,...,p} in Figure 5.a and we immediately see that p∗ = 4. Then, the fraction φm corresponds with









. We depict a sufficiently small environment
T ∩Dd around this point (as shown in Figure 5.a) and display this set in Figure 5.b. We obtain φ1 = 16 , φ2 = 16 ,
φ3 =
1
3 and φ4 =
1
3 . Note that, instead of the triangle T with λ̄ =
1
3 , we could have depicted every triangle where


















(a) Simplex T of three-division unit-cube. The
numbers reflect the areas: m : T ∩ Km for all






(b) A sufficiently small environment of the di-
agonal, where φ2 corresponds with the nor-










Figure 5: Illustration of the Weighted Aumann-Shapley value corresponding to Example 6.8.
So, Division 2, which holds the portfolio with the highest expected loss, get assigned the lowest risk capital allocation.
This is due to large hedge benefits as the loss in state ω5 is high for this portfolio, while this state is the best case
scenario for the firm. ▽
Remark We can prove Theorem 6.7 using a diagonal width dn = n




. Then, we can




EQm [Xi] · φm +O(ε) +Oε(n−
1
2+δ(|N |+2)), for all R ∈ R and i ∈ N.
In this section, we depicted δ = 18|N | to avoid tedious results.
6.3 Properties of the Weighted Aumann-Shapley value
In this subsection, we show some properties of the Weighted Aumann-Shapley value. As stated earlier, the Weighted
Aumann-Shapley value equals the Aumann-Shapley if the risk capital function r is differentiable in eN . This follows
directly from Theorem 6.7 and is shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 6.9 For all R ∈ R′, it holds that
WAS(R) = AS(R).
Proof For all R ∈ R′, we have that the risk capital function r is partially differentiable in eN and, so, p∗ = 1.
Then, we get
WAS(R) = (EQ1 [Xi])i∈N (55)
= AS(R), (56)
where (55) follows from Theorem 6.7 and (54), and (56) follows from (20). This concludes the proof. 
This result is stated for the Aumann-Shapley mechanism in cost sharing by Moulin (1995). Moulin, however,
typically requires the function r to be continuously differentiable, whereas this typically does not need to be satisfied
in case that ρ is a coherent risk measure.
We next show a range of values of φm.
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Proof Let R ∈ R. Suppose φm > 12 for an m ∈ {1, . . . , p∗} and p∗ > 1. Note that µ(Sℓ ∩ Sℓ′) = 0 for all
ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ {1, . . . , p∗} such that ℓ 6= ℓ′, where µ is the surface area on S. Moreover, we have z ∈ S if and only if −z ∈ S.
From these two results, we obtain that there must exists a z ∈ Sm such that fQm(z) > maxℓ∈{1,...,p∗}\m fQℓ(z) and
−z ∈ Sm. So, let z ∈ Sm such that fQm(z) > maxℓ∈{1,...,p∗}\m fQℓ(z). By linearity of fQ, we get fQ(−z) = −fQ(z).




which is a contradiction. Hence, we have φm ≤ 12 or p∗ = 1 so that φm = 1. This concludes the result. 
The range of φm in Proposition 6.10 is tight for |N | > 2, i.e., for every c ∈ [0, 12 ] ∪ {1}, one can construct a risk
capital allocation problem such that φm = c for an m ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}.
Next, we generalize the property that the Aumann-Shapley value, if existent, is in the single-valued fuzzy core
(see Theorem 3.4). We namely show that the Weighted Aumann-Shapley is always is the fuzzy core.
Proposition 6.11 The Weighted Aumann-Shapley value satisfies Fuzzy Core Selection on R.
Proof Let R ∈ R. It holds that
FCore(R) = conv{(EQ[Xi])i∈N : Q ∈ Q∗(ρ)} (57)
= conv{(EQm [Xi])i∈N : m ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}}, (58)
where Q∗(ρ) is defined in (19). Here, (57) follows from Theorem 3.5 and (58) follows from Definition 4.3. Moreover,
we showed in Theorem 6.7 that WAS(R) is given by a convex combination of allocation (EQm [Xi])i∈N ) for all
m ∈ {1, . . . , p∗}. Hence, we have WAS(R) ∈ FCore(R). 
All properties that are satisfied by path based allocation rules are also satisfied by the Weighted Aumann-Shapley
value. This holds as this rule is the average over allocation rules based on a path. Hence, according to Theorem 5.4,
the Weighted Aumann-Shapley value satisfies Translation Invariance, Scale Invariance and Monotonicity on R.
Let ∇+r(eN ) be the right derivative of the risk capital function r in eN and ∇−r(eN ) the corresponding left
derivative. We straightforwardly obtain from Theorem 6.7 the following result for risk capital allocation problems
with two divisions.








One can easily verify that ∇+r(eN ) = (max{EQ[Xi] : Q ∈ Q∗(ρ)})i∈N and ∇−r(eN ) = (min{EQ[Xi] : Q ∈
Q∗(ρ)})i∈N , where Q∗(ρ) is defined in (19).
Remark We note that we only need positive homogeneity and piecewise linearity of the risk capital function r for
Theorem 6.7 to hold, where EQm [Xi] is then replaced by
∂r
∂λi
(λ) for λ ∈ Km with obvious meaning of notation.
On this class of allocation problems, also Proposition 6.10, Proposition 6.11 and Corollary 6.12 hold. For only a
piecewise linear function r, one can also deduce a closed form expression of Kn in Theorem 6.7 based on derivatives
of r in participation profiles along the diagonal.
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7 Conclusion
This paper considers the allocation problem that arises when the total risk capital withheld by a firm needs to
be divided over several portfolios within the firm. We propose a generalization of the Aumann-Shapley value for
risk capital allocation problems. The Aumann-Shapley value receives considerable attention in the literature. It is
well-known that this allocation rule requires differentiability of the fuzzy game for existence.
Our rule is also well-defined in case a differentiability condition is not satisfied. We introduce this allocation
rule inspired by the Shapley value in a fuzzy setting. It follows a much weaker asymptotic approach than the one
proposed by Aumann and Shapley (1974). The asymptotic approach of Aumann and Shapley (1974) is not valid for
fuzzy games related to risk capital allocation problems. We take a grid on a fuzzy participation set, define paths on
this grid and construct an allocation rule based on a path. Then, we show that the limit of the average over these
allocations exists, when the grid size converges to zero. We define the Weighted Aumann-Shapley value as this limit.
We provide an explicit formula for this allocation rule, which has a geometric interpretation. This allocation rule
happens to coincide with the Mertens value. Moreover, it satisfies some properties which are known to hold for the
Aumann-Shapley value.
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A Proof of Proposition 6.2
In this appendix, we use the following notation. The set G̃nk is given by
G̃nk =
{







, for all n ∈ IN and k ∈ {0, . . . , |N |n}. (59)
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The set G̃nk consists of all participation profiles on the grid where the sum of the coordinates is constant. Note that
we have
G̃nk = {P (k) : P ∈ Pn}, for all n ∈ IN and k ∈ {0, . . . , |N |n}. (60)





















|Pn| · [r(P (k + 1))− r(P (k))] · ei(P,k), (63)


















































[r (λ+ (1/n) · ei)− r(λ)] · tn(λ) · pni (λ), (69)
where we define
tn(λ) =







as the fraction of paths in Pn that pass through λ and
pni (λ) =
















as the fraction of the paths in Pn passing through λ, that pass through λ + 1n · ei as well. Here, (64) follows from
(63), (65) follows from (28), (66) follows from (60), (67) follows from the fact that if k ∈ {0, . . . , |N |n − 1} and
λ ∈ G̃nk are such that λi = 1 then no path P ∈ Pn exists with i(P, k) = i and P (k) = λ, (68) follows from the fact




n and Gnk1 ∩Gnk2 = ∅ if k1 6= k2.
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Next, we show (42). Any path can be regarded as an ordered sequence of |N |n steps, where for every division
i ∈ N precisely n steps are made in the direction of division i. Hence,
|Pn| = (|N |n)!
(n!)|N |
. (70)




= λ is given by














j∈N (nλj)! · (n(1 − λj))!
. (71)
Hence, one can verify that dividing (71) by (70) yields (42). Note that, keeping λ̄ constant, the various values of
tn(λ) constitute a density function of some multivariate hypergeometric distribution.
Finally, we show (43). The number of paths P in Pn with P (|N |nλ̄) = λ and i(P, |N |nλ̄) = i (i.e. passing
through λ and λ+ (1/n) · ei) is given by:









}∣∣ = (|N |nλ̄)! · (|N |n(1− λ̄)− 1)!∏
j∈N (nλj)! ·
∏
j∈N\{i}(n(1 − λj))! · (n(1− λi)− 1)!
. (72)
Dividing (72) by (71) yields (43) in a straightforward way.
B Proof of Proposition 6.3
In this appendix, we use the following definitions, notation and properties:
• The function g : IR+ → IR is given by
g(x) =
{
x · ln(x) if x > 0,
0 if x = 0.
• The function G : [0, 1]N → IR is given by














g(1− λi), for all λ ∈ [0, 1]N . (73)
• For all λ ∈ [0, 1]N , we define
Nλ1 = {i ∈ N : λi > 0} and Nλ2 = {i ∈ N : λi < 1}. (74)
• For x, y ∈ IR we denote [x; y] as the interval [min{x, y},max{x, y}], i.e., [x; y] = [x, y] if x ≤ y and [x; y] = [y, x]
if x > y.
• Some arithmetic rules of the Bachmann-Landau notation are given by:
f(n) = O(na), g(n) = O(nb) → f(n) + g(n) = O(na), for all a ≥ b,
f(n) = O(na), g(n) = O(n−∞) → f(n) + g(n) = O(na), for all a ∈ IR,
f(n) = O(na), g(n) = O(nb) → f(n) · g(n) = O(na+b), for all a, b ∈ IR,
f(n) = O(na) → f(n) = O(nb), for all a ≤ b.
Moreover, we have
f(n) = O(na), g(n) = Oε(nb) → f(n) + g(n) = Oε(na), for all a ≥ b.
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• It is well known that for any k ∈ IR, δ > 0 and c ∈ (0, 1) the function f : IN → IR++, defined by f(n) = nk ·cn
δ
,
is such that f(n) = O(n−∞).
Lemma B.1 The function g is continuous and strictly convex, i.e., if x, y ∈ IR+, x 6= y and λ ∈ (0, 1), then
g(λ · x+ (1− λ) · y) < λ · g(x) + (1− λ) · g(y).
Proof Continuity of f follows from continuity of x → x ln(x) for x > 0 and the fact that limx↓0 x · ln(x) = 0. Strict
convexity follows from g′′(x) = 1x > 0 for every x > 0. 
Lemma B.2 For the function G the following holds:
1. G is continuous;
2. G(λ) ≤ 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1]N ; moreover, G(λ) = 0 if and only if λ1 = λ2 = . . . = λ|N |;
3. for all λ ∈ (0, 1)N , we have
G(λ) = −c(λ̄) · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖2 +R,
where |R| ≤ 13 |N | ·min{λ1, . . . , λ|N |, 1− λ1, . . . , 1− λ|N |}−2 · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖3.
Proof 1. This follows from continuity of g (Lemma B.1).
2. This follows from strict convexity of g (Lemma B.1).
3. Let λ ∈ (0, 1)N and i ∈ N . Then, there exists a ξi,1 ∈ [λi; λ̄] such that
g(λi) = g(λ̄) + g
′(λ̄) · (λi − λ̄) +
g′′(λ̄)
2
· (λi − λ̄)2 +
g′′′(ξi,1)
6
· (λi − λ̄)3 (75)
= g(λ̄) + [ln(λ̄) + 1] · (λi − λ̄) +
1
2λ̄
· (λi − λ̄)2 −
1
6ξ2i,1
· (λi − λ̄)3, (76)
where (75) follows from Taylor’s theorem. Note that
∑
i∈N
(λi − λ̄) = 0. (77)
Then, summing the expression (76) of g(λi) for all i ∈ N yields
∑
i∈N
g(λi) = |N | · g(λ̄) +
1
2λ̄









g(1− λi) = |N | · g(1− λ̄) +
1






· (λi − λ̄)3.
where ξi,2 ∈ [1 − λi; 1 − λ̄] for all i ∈ N . Now the upperbound of |R| follows from ξi,1 ≥ min{λ1, . . . , λ|N |},
ξi,2 ≥ min{1− λ1, . . . , 1− λ|N |} and |(λi − λ̄)3| ≤ ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖3 for all i ∈ N .

Lemma B.3 Let d, ε > 0. Then, for all λ ∈ Gε ∩Dd, we have
min{λ1, . . . , λ|N |, 1− λ1, . . . , 1− λ|N |} > ε− d.
Proof Let λ ∈ Gε ∩ Dd. Since
∣∣λi − λ̄
∣∣ ≤
∥∥λ− λ̄ · eN
∥∥ < d, we obtain λi > λ̄ − d and 1 − λi > 1 − λ̄ − d for all
i ∈ N . Moreover, we have ε ≤ λ̄ ≤ 1 − ε. Hence, we obtain λi > ε − d and 1 − λi > ε − d for all i ∈ N . This
concludes the proof. 
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nmin({λj : j ∈ Nλ1 } ∪ {1− λj : j ∈ Nλ2 })
)]
, (78)
where Nλ1 and N
λ
2 are defined in (74).













(n!)|N | · (|N |nλ̄)! · (|N |n(1 − λ̄))!
(|N |n)! ·∏i∈N ((nλi)! · (n(1− λi))!)
=
(n!)|N | · (|N |nλ̄)! · (|N |n(1− λ̄))!





Taking the logarithm yields







ln((n(1 − λi))!). (79)
Now, using Stirling’s approximation, which is given by







, for all n ∈ IN,
formula (79) can be written as
ln(tn(λ)) = |N |g(n)− |N |n+ 1
2












+ g(|N |n(1− λ̄))− |N |(n(1− λ̄)) + 1
2







































Now, using that g(xy) = xg(y)+ yg(x) for all x, y ≥ 0, g(0) = 0,∑i∈Nλ1 λi = |N |λ̄ and
∑
i∈Nλ2
(1−λi) = |N |(1− λ̄),
we get
ln(tn(λ)) = |N |g(n)− |N |n+ 1
2



























































− |N |(1 − λ̄)g(n)−
∑
i∈N


















From |N |g(n)− |N |λ̄g(n)− |N |(1− λ̄)g(n) = 0, −|N |n− |N |nλ̄− |N |(n(1− λ̄)) + |N |n+ |N |nλ̄+ |N |n(1− λ̄) = 0,
λ̄g(|N |n) + (1− λ̄)g(|N |n)− g(|N |n) = 0 and rearranging and collecting some terms follows that














(1 + |N | − |Nλ1 | − |Nλ2 |)
]



















































Then, recall the function G from (73). We get




(1 + |N | − |Nλ1 | − |Nλ2 |)
]
· ln(2πn) + 1
2





































































































Then, as λi ≥ min{λj : j ∈ Nλ1 } for all i ∈ Nλ1 ,1−λi ≥ min{1−λj : j ∈ Nλ2 } for all i ∈ Nλ2 , λ̄ ≥ 1|N | min{λj : j ∈ Nλ1 }
and 1− λ̄ ≥ 1|N | min{1− λj : j ∈ Nλ2 }, the result follows in a straightforward way. 
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Lemma B.5 We have for all (ε, n, λ) ∈ Dom with dn < 12ε and λ ∈ D(n) that








= 1 +Oε(n−1+ 14|N| ). (80)
Proof According to Lemma B.3 we have λi ≥ 12ε and 1−λi ≥ 12ε for all i ∈ N . Consequently, we have λ̄ ≥ 12ε and
1− λ̄ ≥ 12ε. According to Taylor’s theorem, we have
ln(λi) = ln(λ̄) +
1
λ̄
· (λi − λ̄)−
1
2ξ2i,1
· (λi − λ̄)2, (81)



























· (λ̄− λi)2, (83)










· (λ̄− λi)2 ≤ 2|N | · ε−2 · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖2
≤ 2|N | · ε−2 · d2n
= 2|N | · ε−2 · n−1+ 14|N|
= Oε(n−1+ 14|N| ).




4|N| ) = 1 +Oε(n−1+ 14|N| ).
Now taking the exponent in (82) and (83) yields the desired result. 
Proof of Proposition 6.3: We prove the result step-by-step: (46) is shown in Lemma B.6, (47) in Lemma
B.7, (48) in Lemma B.8 and (49) in Lemma B.9. We implicitly use in the statement of this proposition that if
g(n) = O(nc) for some c ≤ − 14 , we have g(n) = O(n−
1
4 ). Note that the result follows directly if |N | = 1, so we let
|N | ≥ 2.
















, if λ ∈ D(n).
Proof It is sufficient to show this result for all n ∈ IN such that dn < 12ε. From Lemma B.3, we then get







2 = N. (85)
30




8|N| ), we get that
























where (86) follows from the fact that ex = 1 +O(x) if x ∈ [0,K] for some constant K > 0. Substituting (80), (84),
(85) and (86) in (78) yields the desired result. 
Lemma B.7 We have for all (ε, n, λ) ∈ Dom that
tn(λ) = Oε(n−∞), if λ /∈ D(n).
Proof Let ε ∈ (0, 1), denote d = 13|N | · ε2 and recall the function G in (73). The set Gε\Dd is compact. Moreover,
the function G is continuous (Lemma B.2.1). Hence, the function G takes a maximum value mε on Gε\Dd. As
λ ∈ Dd if λ1 = . . . = λ|N |, we obtain from Lemma B.2.2 that mε < 0. Let (n, λ) be such that n ∈ IN and λ ∈ Gnε \Dd.
Since λi ≥ 1n for all i ∈ Nλ1 , 1− λi ≥ 1n for all i ∈ Nλ2 and λ̄(1− λ̄) < 1, we get from Lemma B.4 that
tn(λ) = Oε(n 12 (1+|N |) · (emε)n).
Since emε ∈ (0, 1) and limn→∞ cn · nd = 0 for c ∈ (0, 1) and d ∈ IR, we have for all (ε, n, λ) ∈ Dom that
tn(λ) = Oε(n−∞), if λ /∈ Dd.
Next, we show this result for all (n, λ) such that n ∈ IN and λ ∈ (Gnε ∩Dd)\D(n). We obtain from Lemma B.2.3
that
G(λ) = −c(λ̄) · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖2 +R
= −c(λ̄) · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖2 ·
[
1−R · (c(λ̄))−1 · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖−2
]
,
where |R| ≤ 13 |N | ·min{λ1, . . . , λ|N |, 1− λ1, . . . , 1− λ|N |}−2 · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖3. From Lemma B.3, we get
min{λ1, . . . , λ|N |, 1− λ1, . . . , 1− λ|N |} > ε− d >
3|N | − 1




Moreover, we have (c(λ̄))−1 = 2λ̄(1− λ̄) ≤ 12 and ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖ < d. Therefore, we have









· d < 1
2
.
So, then, we obtain that
nG(λ) < −c(λ̄) · n · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖2 ·
1
2
≤ −n · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖2 ≤ −n
1
4|N| ,










4|N| · n 12 (1−|N |)) (89)
= Oε(n−∞), (90)
where (88) follows from Lemma B.4, (89) follows from (87) and (90) follows from the fact that limn→∞ n
k · cnδ = 0
for all k ∈ IR, c ∈ (0, 1) and δ > 0. 













, if λ ∈ D(n).


























ε|N | , (92)





(92) follows from 1− λ̄ ≥ ε. This concludes the proof. 
Lemma B.9 We have for all i ∈ N and (ε, n, λ) ∈ Dom that
pni (λ) = O(1).
Proof This follows directly from 0 ≤ pni (λ) ≤ 1. 
C Proof of Proposition 6.5
In this appendix, we use the following notation:
• For all x ∈ IR, we write ⌊x⌋ as the largest integer not greater than x and ⌈x⌉ as the smallest integer not less
than x.






· x : x ∈ [0, 1]N
}
. (93)
• The set D′(n) is given by
D′(n) = Dd
′
n , where d′n = dn + (
√





• If there might be confusion about the notation | · | for the absolute value of a real number and the cardinality
of a set, we sometimes write ♯(A) as the cardinality of the set A.
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• We write ν(B) as the Lebesgue measure of the set B. Note that
ν(Cn(λ)) = n−|N |, for all λ ∈ Gn, (95)
and




8|N| ), for all n ∈ IN. (96)
• Let R ∈ R and ε > 0. We define the set B(R, n) by
B(R, n) =
{




for all R ∈ R and n ∈ IN, where L(R) is defined in Definition 4.5. This is the set of all participation profiles
close to a participation profile that is an element of multiple sets Km. As the risk capital allocation problem
is always clear from the context, we write B(n) = B(R, n).
First, we show that only the participation profiles in Gnε have a non-negligible aggregate contribution.






tn(λ) · pni (λ) = O(ε) +O(n−1).










































= ⌈ε|N |n⌉+ ⌈ε|N |n⌉ − 1
< 2ε|N |n+ 1 (101)
= O(ε) · n+O(1).
Here, (98) follows from (59) and (68), (99) follows from 0 ≤ pni (λ) ≤ 1 for all λ ∈ Gn\{eN}, (100) follows from∑
λ∈G̃n
k
tn(λ) = 1 for all k ∈ {0, . . . , |N |n− 1} and (101 follows from the fact that ⌈x⌉ < x+ 1 for all x ∈ IR. 
The following result follows almost directly from Proposition 6.3.





tn(λ) · pni (λ) = Oε(n−∞).











< (n+ 1)|N | · Oε(n−∞) (103)
= Oε(n−∞),
where (102) follows from Proposition 6.3 and (103) follows from ♯({λ ∈ [Gnε \D(n)] : λi < 1}) < ♯(Gn) = (n+ 1)|N |.

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Lemma C.3 Let R ∈ R. Then, we have





for all i ∈ N and (n, λ) such that n ∈ IN, λ ∈ Gn and λi < 1.
Proof Denote c = max{|fQ(ej)| : Q ∈ Q(ρ), j ∈ N}. Let Q1,Q2 ∈ Q(ρ) be such that r (λ+ (1/n) · ei) =
fQ1 (λ+ (1/n) · ei) and r(λ) = fQ2(λ). Then, we have
r (λ+ (1/n) · ei)− r(λ) = fQ1 (λ− (1/n) · ei)− fQ2 (λ)









r (λ+ (1/n) · ei)− r(λ) = fQ1 (λ+ (1/n) · ei)− fQ2 (λ)








This concludes the proof. 





|tn(λ) · pni (λ)− hn(λ)| = Oε(n
3
4 ).
Proof It is sufficient to show this result only for n ∈ IN such that dn < 12ε. If |N | = 1 the result is trivial as
tn(λ) · pni (λ) = hn(λ) = 1 for all λ ∈ Gnε . Next, we let |N | ≥ 2. For all λ ∈ Gnε ∩D(n), we have
|tn(λ) · pni (λ) − hn(λ)| =













= Oε(n− 12 |N |+ 38|N| ), (105)
where (104) follows from Lemma B.6 and Lemma B.8 and (105) follows from hn(λ) = Oε(n 12 (1−|N |)). If y ∈ Cn(λ)
for a λ ∈ Gnε ∩D(n), we have
‖y − ȳ · eN‖ ≤ ‖y − λ̄ · eN‖ (106)
≤ ‖y − λ‖ + ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖ (107)
< (
√
|N |/n) + n− 12+ 18|N| , (108)
where (106) and (107) follow from the triangular inequality and (108) follows from the fact that ‖y−λ‖ ≤ (
√
|N |/n)





Cn(λ) ⊂ D′(n). (109)
From this and (95), we get
n−|N | · ♯(Gnε ∩D(n)) ≤ ν (D′(n)) (110)
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= O(n− 12 |N |+ 58− 18|N| ), (112)











= Oε(n 58+ 28|N| ).
As |N | ≥ 2, this concludes the proof. 
Lemma C.5 Let R ∈ R. Then, for all ε > 0 and all m ∈ {p∗ + 1, . . . , p}, we have for sufficiently large n that
Gε ∩D(n) ∩Km = ∅.
Proof If p∗ = p, the result follows directly and, so, we let p∗ < p. Denote




(eN ) > 0,
and let ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , p∗} and m ∈ {p∗ + 1, . . . , p}. Then, we have
fQℓ(eN ) ≥ fQm(eN ) + α.
By linearity of fQℓ , we have
fQℓ(t · eN )− fQm(t · eN ) = t · (fQℓ(eN )− fQm(eN )) ≥ t · α, for all t ∈ [0, 1]. (113)
If fQ
m′
(ei) = 0 for all m
′ ∈ {1, . . . , p} and for all i ∈ N , we have p = p∗ = 1, which contradicts the assumption that





and let n > Nε.
Then, we obtain for every λ ∈ Gε ∩D(n) that
fQℓ(λ) − fQm(λ) = fQℓ(λ̄ · eN )− fQm(λ̄ · eN ) + fQℓ(λ− λ̄ · eN )− fQm(λ− λ̄ · eN ) (114)
≥ λ̄α+ fQℓ(λ− λ̄ · eN )− fQm(λ− λ̄ · eN ), (115)
where (114) follows from linearity of fQℓ and fQm and (115) follows from (113). Moreover, we obtain that
|fQ
m′
(λ− λ̄ · eN)| ≤ ‖(fQ
m′
(ei))i∈N‖ · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖ (116)








ε · α (119)
≤ 1
2
λ̄ · α, (120)
for all m′ ∈ {1, . . . , p}, where (116) follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality applied to∑i∈N fQm(ei) · (λi − λ̄),
(117) follows from m′ ∈ {1, . . . , p} and λ ∈ D(n), (118) follows from n > Nε, (119) follows from substituting
the definition of Nε, follows from and (120) follows from λ ∈ Gε. Hence, substituting (120) in (115) yields that
fQℓ(λ)− fQm(λ) > 0. Therefore, we have λ /∈ Km for every λ ∈ Gε ∩D(n) and, hence,
Gε ∩D(n) ∩Km = ∅. (121)

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Km, for large n.
We next show that we can neglect participation profiles close to profiles where the function r is non-differentiable.
Note that B(n), as defined in (97), is the set of participation profiles close to a participation profile where the function
r is non-differentiable. For all n ∈ IN we have that if λ ∈ Km\B(n) for some m ∈ {1, . . . , p}, then λ+(1/n) ·ei ∈ Km
for all i ∈ N and, by linearity of fQm , r (λ+ (1/n) · ei)− r(λ) = 1n ·EQm [Xi].





hn(λ) = Oε(n 58 ).






Let ε > 0, ℓ,m ∈ {1, . . . , p}, ℓ 6= m and n > 2ε . We define
Hn(ℓ,m) =
{





andDε = {λ ∈ Gε : λ = λ̄·eN}. According to Lemma C.5 we have for allm ∈ {p∗+1, . . . , p} thatDε∩Km = ∅. Since
Dε and Km are both compact we can define αε,m = dist(Dε,Km) = min{‖x − y‖ : x ∈ Dε, y ∈ Km}. Obviously,
αε,m > 0. So, if ℓ /∈ {1, . . . , p∗} or m /∈ {1, . . . , p∗} we get Hn(ℓ,m) = ∅ for large n. If p∗ = 1 it follows from this




λ ∈ IRN :
∑
i∈N
λi · (EQℓ [Xi]− EQm [Xi]) = 0
}
:= V (ℓ,m).
Note that V (ℓ,m) is an (|N |−1)-dimensional linear space where {t·eN : t ∈ IR} ⊂ V (ℓ,m). To obtain an upperbound
of the cardinality of Hn(ℓ,m), we first derive the Lebesgue measure of the following Euclidean set
H̃n(ℓ,m) =
{
λ ∈ G 1
2 ε














, u1, . . . , u|N |−1 is an orthonormal basis of the (|N | − 1)-dimensional space V (ℓ,m) and u|N | is a unit
normal vector of the (|N |−1)-dimensional space V (ℓ,m). So u|N | is a multiple of the vector (EQℓ [Xi]−EQm [Xi])i∈N .






Let λ2 = λ̄1 · eN (= λ̄ · eN) be the unique element in {t · eN : t ∈ IR} that is closest to λ1 (and hence closest to λ).
We provide an overview of the construction of λ1 and λ2 in Figure 6. Obviously ‖λ−λ2‖2 = ‖λ−λ1‖2+‖λ1−λ2‖2
and hence ‖λ1 − λ2‖ ≤ ‖λ − λ2‖ = ‖λ − λ̄ · eN‖ < d′n. Now we can write λ = α1 · u1 + . . . + α|N | · u|N | where





|N |, |αk| ≤
√
α22 + . . .+ α
2
|N |−1 = ‖λ1 − λ2‖ < d′n = O(n
− 12+
1
8|N| ) for all k ∈ {2, . . . , |N | − 1} and
|α|N || = ‖λ− λ1‖ ≤ 1n +
√
|N |
n = O(n−1). Hence,






{t · eN : t ∈ IR}
Figure 6: Illustration of λ1 and λ2 corresponding to the proof of Lemma C.6.
= O(n− 12 |N |+ 18 ). (122)
For all λ ∈ Gnε and y ∈ Cn(λ), we get from
ȳ = λ̄+ (ȳ − λ̄)
{
≥ ε− (1/n) > 12ε,
≤ 1− ε+ (1/n) < 1− 12ε,
(123)
that y ∈ G 1
2 ε
. Moreover, we get
min
λ̂∈V (ℓ,m)









, for all λ ∈ Hn(ℓ,m) and y ∈ Cn(λ).
From this, (109) and (123), we get
⋃
λ∈Hn(ℓ,m)
Cn(λ) ⊂ H̃n(ℓ,m), for all n ∈ IN such that n > 2
ε
. (124)
From (95) and (124) we get
n−|N | · ♯(Hn(ℓ,m)) ≤ ν(H̃n(ℓ,m)). (125)
Substituting (122) in (125) yields



























· O(n 12 |N |+ 18 ) · Oε(n 12 (1−|N |)) (129)
= Oε(n 58 ),





and (129) follows from
(126) and hn(λ) = Oε(n 12 (1−|N |)) for all λ ∈ Gε. This concludes the proof. 
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hn(λ) +O(ε) +Oε(n− 14 ), (137)
where (130) follows from Proposition 6.2, (131) follows from Lemma C.1 and Lemma C.3, (132) follows from Lemma
C.2 and Lemma C.3, (133) follows from Lemma C.3 and Lemma C.4, (134) follows from Lemma C.3 and Lemma
C.6, (135) follows from [0, 1]N\L(R) ⊂ B(n), (136) follows from Lemma C.5 and (137) follows from Lemma C.6.
This concludes the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 6.6
In this appendix, we use the same notation as in Appendix C.
Lemma D.1 The function hn is differentiable for a fixed n ∈ IN, and, moreover, we have for all i ∈ N and
(ε, n, λ) ∈ Dom that
∂hn
∂λi
(λ) = Oε(n− 12 |N |+1+ 18|N| ), if λ ∈ D′(n),
where D′(n) is defined in (94).












, for all λ ∈ [0, 1]N\{e∅, eN}. (138)
Moreover, we obtain the following approximations for all λ ∈ Gε ∩D′(n):
∂fn
∂λi














2|N |(λ̄(1− λ̄))2 · n · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖
2
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2|N |(λ̄(1− λ̄))2 · n · ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖
2
= Oε(n 12+ 18|N| ) +Oε(n 14|N| ) (139)





hn(λ) = Oε(n 12 (1−|N |)),




8|N| ). Then, the result follows from substituting
these equations in (138). 












hn(λ∗)dλ∗ +Oε(n 58 ),
where Cn(λ) is defined in (93)
Proof Let ε > 0. It is sufficient to show this result for all n ∈ IN such that n > 2ε . Let λ ∈ Gnε ∩D(n). From (109)
and (123) follows that
Cn(λ) ⊂ G 1
2 ε
∩D′(n). (140)
We get from (140) and Lemma D.1 that hn is differentiable in λ∗ for all λ∗ ∈ Cn(λ). Applying Taylor’s theorem
yields that





(χ) · (λi − λ∗i ), for all λ∗ ∈ Cn(λ), where χ ∈ conv{λ, λ∗}. (141)
Here, as χ ∈ Cn(λ), we get from Lemma D.1 that
∂h
∂λi
(χ) = Oε(n− 12 |N |+1+ 18|N| ), for all i ∈ N. (142)
So, as |λi − λ∗i | ≤ n−1 for all λ∗ ∈ Cn(λ) and i ∈ N , we get from (141) and (142) that
hn(λ) − hn(λ∗) = |N | · Oε(n− 12 |N |+1+ 18|N| ) · n−1
= Oε(n− 12 |N |+ 18|N| ),
for all λ∗ ∈ Cn(λ). From this, we directly get
hn(λ) − n|N | ·
∫
Cn(λ)
hn(λ∗)dλ∗ = Oε(n− 12 |N |+ 18|N| ), for all λ ∈ Gnε ∩D(n). (143)
Moreover, from (112) we get
♯(Gnε ∩D(n) ∩Km) ≤ ♯(Gnε ∩D(n))
= O(n 12 |N |+ 58− 18|N| ). (144)


















= Oε(n 58 ).
This concludes the result. 










hn(λ)dλ +Oε(n−|N |+ 58 ).
Proof Let ε > 0 and define D′′(n) = Dd
′′
n , where d′′n = dn − (
√
|N |/n). It is sufficient to show this result for all





Cn(λ∗) and B = Gε ∩D(n) ∩Km. Moreover, define
En1 = B(n/(
√
|N |+ 1)) ∩G 1
2 ε
En2 = [Gε−(1/n) ∩D′(n)]\D′′(n)
En3 = [D
′(n) ∩Gε−(1/n)]\Gε+(1/n),
where the set B(n) is defined in (97). We first show
(A\B) ∪ (B\A) ⊂ En1 ∪ En2 ∪ En3 . (145)
Let y1 ∈ A\B, so we have y1 ∈ Cn(λ) for some λ ∈ Gnε ∩ D(n) ∩ Km. If y1 /∈ Km, there is a λ′ ∈ [0, 1]N\L(R)
such that λ′ ∈ conv{λ, y1} and, so, y1 ∈ En1 . If y1 /∈ D(n), we have according to (108) that ‖y1 − ȳ1 · eN‖ <
(
√
|N |/n) + dn = d′n and, so, y1 ∈ En2 . If y1 /∈ Gnε , then ȳ1 < ε or ȳ1 > 1− ε and hence we have according to (123)
that ε − (1/n) ≤ ȳ1 ≤ 1 − (ε − (1/n)) and, so, y1 ∈ En3 . Now, let y2 ∈ B\A, so we have y2 ∈ Gε ∩ D(n) ∩ Km
and there does not exist a λ ∈ Gnε ∩ D(n) ∩Km such that y2 ∈ Cn(λ). Let λ such that y2 ∈ Cn(λ). If λ /∈ Km,
there exists an λ′ ∈ [0, 1]N\L(R) such that λ′ ∈ conv{λ, y2} and, so, y2 ∈ En1 . If λ /∈ D(n), we get from the triangle
inequality that ‖y2 − ȳ2 · eN‖ ≥ ‖λ− λ̄ · eN‖ − ‖y2 − λ‖ ≥ dn − (
√
|N |/n) = d′′n and, so, y2 /∈ D′′(n). So, y2 ∈ En2 .
If λ /∈ Gnε , then λ̄ < ε or λ̄ > 1 − ε and hence ȳ2 = λ̄ + (ȳ2 − λ̄) < ε + (1/n) or ȳ2 < 1 − (ε + (1/n)) and so,

































ν(Enk ) · Oε(n
1
2 (1−|N |)) (149)
= Oε(n−|N |+ 58 ). (150)












n(λ)dλ, (147) follows from (145), (148)
is a standard rule of integration, (149) follows from hn(λ) = Oε(n 12 (1−|N |)) for all λ ∈ G 1
2 ε
and (150) follows from




8 ) (see (122)) and we get in a similar fashion as for (122) via a Gram-Schmidt process that




















= Oε(n− 12 |N |+ 18 ),






|N |/n))|N |−1 · n−1)
= Oε(n− 12 |N |− 38 ).
This concludes the proof. 
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Lemma D.4 For all t ∈ (0, 1) it holds that
∫ n 14|N| /2t(1−t)
0






















∫ n 14|N| /2t(1−t)
0














= K · 2e−n
1
4|N| /4t(1−t) (154)





where K > 0. Here, (152) is a standard integration rule, (153) follows from that there exists a constant K > 0





2 sds = −2(e− 12 b − e− 12a) for all a ≤ b,




concludes the proof. 



























EQm [Xi] · n|N |−1 ·
∫
Gε∩D(n)∩Km




EQm [Xi] · n
1















EQm [Xi] · n
1















EQm [Xi] · n
1














EQm [Xi] · n
1





















EQm [Xi] · φm · n
1















∫ n 14|N| /2t(1−t)
0


















∫ n 14|N| /2t(1−t)
0



























φm ·EQm [Xi] +O(ε) +Oε(n−
1
4 ) (167)
Here, (157) follows from Proposition 6.5, (158) follows from Lemma D.2 and (159) follows from Lemma D.3, (160)
follows from Definition 6.4, (161) follows from the polar coordinate transformation λ = t · eN + r · ω and dλ =
r|N |−2 · |N | 12 d(t, r, ω), (162) follows from the fact that
∫
Sm
dω = µ(Sm), (163) follows from the well-known result







2 |N | − 12
) ,
where Γ is defined in (151), (164) follows from the transformation s = r
2n
2t(1−t) and dr =
√
t(1−t)
2ns ds, (165) follows
from canceling of some terms and (166) follows from Lemma D.4. This concludes the proof.
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